

CAN DEMOCRACY BE EXPORTED?

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The two main wars, which have opened the third millennium—those in Afghanistan and Iraq, have been justified by the United States and its allies with a mixture of arguments. The first, and perhaps foremost, has been self-defense: to eradicate the terrorist roots in Afghanistan and destroy the alleged weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. In addition to this traditional motivation, another has been added: to force a regime change and to export democracy. However, is democracy a good that can be exported like bananas? In what conditions is it feasible and legitimate to export democracy?

Those who assume that democracy is a universal value should face the fact that the planet is composed of a variety of countries, some of which are democratic and some that are not. It is understandable that those with democratic faith assume that the peoples of the earth will be better off by achieving some form of democratic governance; democracy means empowering the people, and it is somehow logical to expect that the people themselves will grasp some advantages by self-governance. But what are the methods that can be used for the purpose?

THE AMERICAN DREAM

To export democracy is an American dream¹ and it is a dream that the Americans provided to the European people. Every Italian recalls the glorious days of the summer of 1944 and the spring of 1945, when the major cities of the country were liberated by allied troops. We use the term “liberated,”

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1. On the origin of this dream, see TONY SMITH, AMERICA'S MISSION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, 3-33 (1994). For a comprehensive analysis, see AMERICAN DEMOCRACY PROMOTION: IMPULSES, STRATEGIES, AND IMPACTS (Michael Cox, et al. eds., 2000). On military interventions, see James Meernik, United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy, 33 J. PEACE RES. 391 (1996).

because this was the feeling of the vast majority of the Italians, that with the arrival of the allies they saw the end of the Nazi and Fascist brutality, the civil war, and the air raids. At the time, however, the allies referred to Italy as an "occupied" country, because it was an active ally of Nazi Germany until September 8th, 1943.²

Even if Italy had been an enemy until the day before, not a single shot would have been fired at the allies within the peninsula. Hostilities ended once they arrived on the ground. It was quickly forgotten that the allies had heavily bombed Italian cities, causing a number of deaths in the civilian population comparable to the ruthless Nazis' retaliations. On the ground, the allies, especially the Americans, did not strike fear in the populace but, on the contrary, they were immediately accepted as friends and brothers who gave cigarettes, sang, and danced. Above all, they spoke about liberty and democracy.

If the Americans were so well received, we owe it to the Italian Resistance, who fought against the Nazis and the Fascists and spread among the population the idea that they were not our enemies, but instead our allies. In Germany and Japan, the resistance was very small, and the allies did not receive the hearty welcome they did in Italy. Nevertheless, the people never attacked the allies. In all three of the countries, there was an immediate change in the air; perhaps because of the awareness that the occupation troops would only stay for a short time and that, before leaving, they would plant the seeds for a political system that would benefit the entire population: democracy.

The idea that liberated countries should get democratic regimes, even more than obedient ones, was much stronger amongst the Americans than it was amongst the English. The United Kingdom was still a world empire well known for the way it treated its colonies, while the United States promised to found its emerging hegemony on co-operation and democratic nation building. Trade Unions, political parties, information networks, judiciary apparatuses, and production systems all received substantial aid from the American administration. Since then, American foreign policy has reiterated its objective to extend democracy, often doing so through armed intervention. The successful experience of the Second World War has somehow dictated American ideology and foreign policy over the last 60 years.

In fact, exporting democracy has become part of an American's genetic code and a declared goal of its foreign policy. Neither supporting dictatorial governments (like in Latin America during the age of Henry Kissinger), nor conspiring against elected governments (like in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954),

2. The perspective is inverted in Afghanistan and Iraq. The civilian population tends to perceive the United States as an occupation force, while Washington thinks of itself as a liberator.

Indonesia (1955), Brazil (1960s), Chile (1973), and Nicaragua (1980s),³ has swept the idea from the average American's mind that his or her country is not only the freest in the world, but it is also the best at bringing democracy to other countries. Actions that have never been tolerated at home, such as human rights violations, indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations, and even torture, are accepted as inevitable means to achieve the ultimate end: the reign of freedom and democracy.

With what means and with what efficacy has democracy been successfully exported? Unfortunately, the successes achieved in building democracy in Germany, Japan, and Italy cannot be generalized. Trusting in the data collected in a study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,⁴ the United States has usually failed in its main objective when it has tried to export democracy using military means. In the first half of the Twentieth century, these failures have concerned neighboring, and apparently, easily controlled countries, such as Panama (1903-1936), Nicaragua (1909-1933), Haiti (1915-1934), the Dominican Republic (1916-1924) and Cuba (1898-1902, 1906-1909 and 1917-1922).⁵ Analogous failures came about in other parts of the world. In South Korea, a huge military U.S. presence did not generate a democratic government for at least three decades. In South Vietnam and Cambodia, the U.S. did not even make an attempt to combat communism through elected governments. Not even in Haiti, after the end of the Cold War, has success been achieved by the American administration. After the Second World War, they could only count Panama (1989) and Grenada (1983), two tiny states, both heavily connected economically and socially to the United States, as democratic successes. Not even the military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo under the NATO umbrella, with close military and political collaboration between European states and the U.S., have left behind a clear democratic legacy (see Table 1). Thus, the current lack of success, both in Afghanistan and in Iraq, builds on numerous historical precedents.

Military intervention has not always been explicitly adopted to build democratic institutions. In Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia, for example, the objective of democratization was a secondary concern after the containment of communism. In other cases, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, the main target of the intervention was stopping or preventing genocides, although democracy-building was seen as the most effective long-term solution to achieve the goal. Altogether, the American obsession with exporting democracy via its army has brought about more failures than successes.

3. See David P. Forsythe, *Democracy, War and Covert Action*, 29 J. PEACE RES. 385, 386 (1992).

4. See Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, *Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation Building* 2 Policy Brief No. 24 (May 24, 2003) (prepared by Minxin Pei & Sara Kasper), available at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/policybrief24.pdf>. See also Filippo Andreatta, *Democrazia e politica internazionale: pace separata e democratizzazione del sistema internazionale*, 35 RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SCIENZA POLITICA 212, 227.

5. Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, *supra* note 5, at 3.

LEARNED LESSONS

From these experiences, some main lessons can be drawn.

1. The internal context. The level of support enjoyed by the existing regime is a crucial factor. Unfortunately, not all authoritarian regimes are equally opposed by their populations. Even Hitler and Mussolini had a strong public support. Today, there are populist and theocratic regimes, like the Iranian one, that have a broad support among the population, actually ratified by free and fair elections. Wanting to impose democracy against the will of the same people is simply nonsense.

It is not even enough for a regime to have an internal opposition; it is also necessary to have a strong indigenous desire to institute a democratic regime and competent elites to represent them. If internal oppositions are not committed to the rules of democracy, an external intervention is likely to lead to a regime change where an authoritarian regime is replaced by a similar regime or, even worse, by a civil war.

2. Restoration is easier. It is much easier to reintroduce democracy than to introduce it for the first time. In countries like Italy and Germany, the existence of democratic institutions before the arrival of dictatorships constituted a model. Opposition parties and groups continued to survive clandestinely inside and outside these countries. These groups took the task of transitioning the old state to its new regime. In countries that have never experienced democracy, its application seems to be fraught with greater difficulty.

3. Aggression is counterproductive. The efficacy of the regime change after the Second World War was a result of the fact that the war was begun by the fascist regimes. Their military defeat discredited the old regimes internally, and made the public realize that it was necessary to try or return to another type of political organization. The same conditions existed in Iraq after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, but at the time the coalition forces - rather than undertaking a regime change - decided to leave Saddam Hussein in power. When democracies begin the war, the public of aggressed countries feel like victims and become hostile toward the political regime forwarded by the invaders. Aggression generates a perverted "rally-around-the-flag" effect, even when the flag is in the hands of dictators. There are, obviously, exceptions to this, like in Grenada and Panama, but these come from small countries, with very unpopular authoritarian governments.

4. Acceptance of the transitional administration. If the transitional administration of the occupation force is not socially integrated at the local level, the regime change is perceived to be externally imposed. The

transitional administration and its intentions are, obviously, heavily scrutinized by the civilian population, scrutiny no less severe than what the colonized peoples reserved to their colonizers. The cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic affinities between the provisional administration and the occupied countries become crucial. Due to concerns about being colonized, the local populations are generally hostile when they confront a transitional administration, which can become permanent and overbearing. In Afghanistan and in Iraq, the provisional administrations are officially multilateral, but, in effect, they are dominated by the United States, a country with little or no affinity with the local population, and which actually provokes deep hostilities.

LEGITIMATE METHODS

Exporting democracy militarily is, thus, an operation much more complicated and uncertain than some politicians have made it out to be.⁶ However, efficacy is not the only way to evaluate a political project. There is hope that those who want to export democracy do so because they believe in its intrinsic value. In this case, they should not just consider the scant efficacy, but also the democratic legitimacy. Assuming, hypothetically, that exporting democracy through a military intervention is effective, would this then justify its imposition? There are good reasons to harbor some doubts about it.

If a population is dissatisfied with its legitimate political regime, it can rebel. In the moment in which the relationship between the government and its public is broken, up to the point where open conflict develops, it is legitimate for external forces to intervene because the conflict has already flared up, and foreign forces will not be responsible for having broken the internal peace. When diverse groups compete for power, it becomes permissible for democratic states to provide real support to political parties who advocate the introduction of a democratic system. However, in the absence of an explicit rebellion or any other manifestation that shows the popular interest in a regime change, an intervention becomes ethically unsound.⁷ It is difficult to explain why the people of a democratic country should risk their lives to introduce democracies in a dictatorial country when the people of the latter are not willing to risk their lives for the same purpose

6. For opposite perspectives on state-building and democratic governance, see FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, STATE-BUILDING, GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2004); CAN DEMOCRACY BE DESIGNED?: THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE IN CONFLICT-TORN SOCIETIES, (Sunil Bastian & Robin Luckham eds., 2003). For a variety of different perspectives on exporting democracy, see THOMAS CAROTHERS, ET AL., MULTILATERAL STRATEGIES TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, (Andrew Kuper ed., 2004), available at http://www.cceia.org/resources/articles_papers_reports/1116.html/_res/id=sa_File1/1116_Multi_Strat_to_Prom_Dem_2.pdf.

7. See Michael Walzer, Regime Change and Just War, DISSENT MAGAZINE, Summer 2006, at 103, 108, available at <http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=663>.

or, even more, have not expressed an explicit interest in such a form of government.

One can argue that an intervention could be all the more necessary when a population is oppressed by a brutal dictator, so brutal that he has suppressed every form of opposition. Saddam Hussein had preemptively wiped out every possible opposition. In this case, the motivation to intervene has a humanitarian basis and is not necessarily related to the introduction of democracy. The objectives of intervention should be much more modest and primarily oriented toward inhibiting mass slaughter rather than toward imposing a specific institutional form. The attempt to save strangers is a rather different one from the attempt to induce a country to build democratic institutions. An intervention dictated by humanitarian goals can be rather short, as in the case of the interventions carried out by India in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 1971, Tanzania in Uganda in 1979, and Vietnam in Cambodia in 1979.⁸ As these three best-practice historical experiences show, humanitarian interventions do not necessarily need to be carried out by a democratic state.

Building a democracy without the internal ingredients is a much more risky and long-term project, as it is evident today in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the case of Iraq, moreover, the fact that Western forces abandoned internal oppositions when they attempted to rebel in 1990s, leaving them in the hands of Saddam Hussein's vicious repression, made it even more difficult to create the trust between the occupying forces and the local civil society, which should have become the alternative leadership.

In the moment in which one opts to use military force to promote democracy, there arises a contradiction between the means and the ends. The violent means of war do not exclusively involve despots, but they inevitably end up also having an impact on the citizens, whom we assume would benefit from a democratic regime. Despite surgical bombardments, smart bombs, and other technological developments, war is still a dirty affair, with consequences that impact entire populations indiscriminately. Thus, one finds oneself in a situation reminiscent of something George Orwell would write: one uses war to promote peace, and one applies violence to secure democracy.

Finally, the effects that a military intervention will have in a democratic state should also be considered. When at war, every state is compelled to sacrifice some of its freedom. Citizens are sent into battle, civil liberties are decreased, and the capabilities of the armed forces (the army, intelligence agencies, the control apparatus) are raised at the expense of transparency and control. Democracies at war inevitably develop chronic diseases. The United

8. I draw on the account of humanitarian interventions made by Nicholas Wheeler. NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, *SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY* (2000). For my own reflections on the theme, see Daniele Archibugi, *Cosmopolitan Guidelines for Humanitarian Intervention*, 29 ALTERNATIVES 1 (2004).

States and Great Britain, involved in an infinite number of conflicts of both high and low intensity since the end of the Second World War, have preserved their domestic democratic systems incredibly well until now. However, not even these two states could avoid seeing some of their democratic values burned on the altar of national interest. Because of the necessities of war, they have committed and often justified the murder of unarmed civilians, torture, and detentions without legal basis. These things would have never been consented to by the public under conditions of peace. Exporting democracy also means compromising it domestically and develops a dangerous schizophrenia between how a state treats its own citizens and how it treats aliens.

The idea of exporting democracy also has a very patronizing tone when it is carried out unilaterally. The international system is based upon the principle of equality among states. If a state decides unilaterally that another state requires a regime change, it is violating the principle of equality and it is opening the way for any sort of self-interested interferences. If a national government will be given the faculty to decide which government is legitimate and which is not, we will go back to the *bellum omnium contra omnes* ("the war of all against all"). The rubric of "exporting democracy" may lead to the justification of any war.

This does not imply that all governments should be considered equally legitimate, but an individual government cannot unilaterally decide when other governments are or are not legitimate. To deprive a government of its own legitimacy requires a vast international consensus. There are many significant legal developments in this direction. The most effective way is when member states preventively grant to an international organization the competence to assess the legitimacy of their constitutional evolution. Of course, many tyrannical governments have no intention to devolve such an assessment to international organizations. Not surprisingly, the majority of international organizations, including the UN, have no or very limited competence on the internal constitution of their members.

FROM THE STICK TO THE CARROT

Must we conclude that nothing can be done to export democracy within these reasonable constraints? This is a bit of an extreme conclusion. Democratic states can legitimately be harbingers for the expansion of democracy, as exemplified by the fact that the world's peoples have explicitly, whenever they have had the opportunity, expressed the desire to participate in their own government. The error embedded in the crazed desire to export democracy concerns only the means, not the ends. If the ends are legitimate, what then are the instruments that democratic states should utilize?

The first, and most obvious, instrument concerns economic, social, political, and cultural incentives. The predominance of the West today is so broad that, if the expansion of democracy is really the West's priority, it could

employ greater resources. However, we are quite far from moving in this direction. In 2003, the United States dedicated more than four percent of their gross domestic product to defense spending, while the countries of the European Union dedicated more than two percent. Compared to military spending, only spare change is destined for development aid: 0.1 percent of the GDP of the United States and 0.3 percent of the European Union. Not even this relatively tiny sum is entirely spent on aid to democratic governments.

The carrot, however, is not only economic aid. Economic aid can be extremely useful, but it can also become an imposition. Equally important is offering countries, with the potential to hold democratic elections, the ability to join the club of democratic states under the same conditions as the club's pre-existing members. One needs, in a word, to avoid letting the expansion of democracy end up being a kind of catechistic lesson taught by those who made up the rules. Democracy is a common course, and if one state is legitimately concerned with the events occurring in another state, it should consequently offer to associate that state to its own political community, i.e. enter into an institutional union with the state to which it aids. At the extreme, if a country such as the United States is so concerned with the fate of democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq, it should also be ready to accept them as the 51st and 52nd states of America.

This is obviously an exaggeration, but it is exactly what the European Union (EU) is doing. We often forget that the EU has the greatest success in promoting and consolidating democracy. Countries of Southern and Eastern Europe have found in the European institutions tangible economic incentives, such as the access to the largest market in the world and the opportunity to share political and institutional decisions. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the EU is the international organization with the most demanding criteria for admission (and yet, it is often blamed for its democratic deficit). Once a country is admitted, however, it immediately enjoys the same rights the others do, like participating in institutions and defining the political community, including its foreign policy. The European Union does not limit itself to giving lessons in democracy, but once welcomed, new members collectively and democratically help define the political agenda.

So far, the EU includes countries with high chances of embracing democratic faith and institutions. European countries in the South and East already had a rather high level of social capital and solid political infrastructures when they were admitted to the EU.⁹ But there is also something unique to the EU: it is a civilian and not a military power. People

9. The European Union has also played a discrete but important role in fostering democracy in developing countries. See RICHARD YOUNGS, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY 45-46 (2001); MARIO TELÒ, EUROPE: A CIVILIAN POWER?: EUROPEAN UNION, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, WORLD ORDER 227-32 (2005).

would laugh if anybody in Brussels threatened to “shock and awe.” The fact that the EU has so many different voices also implies that no single nation can fully dominate other countries.

There is another reason that makes the EU so appealing for those living in non-democratic countries: political dignity. As soon as a new member is accepted, it enjoys all the privileges of the oldest members of the club. If Turkey ever joins the EU, it will get a number of parliamentarians equal to that of France, Italy and the United Kingdom. Economic muscle is still very important, but the basic principle is that each member has equal dignity.¹⁰

Europe must reprimand itself for not having used EU membership as an incentive to prevent civil war when the former Yugoslavia dissolved. Perhaps those massacres could have been avoided if the EU had said to all the involved parties, “stop butchering yourselves and we guarantee to the entire political community access to the European Union.” Thus, it would have been possible to make the struggle to define their borders less important, especially if the EU had assumed the task of guaranteeing human rights. In that case, the EU was neither able to offer the carrot nor use the stick. This was a failure, but the only one. The American drive to export democracy with war and aerial bombardments has not helped to salvage these failures.

Outside of the West, the effectiveness of the carrot is reduced. Some dictatorial regimes can resist the incentives and continue to oppress their citizens. The carrot, however, has an enormous advantage over the stick. It does not cause damage for which democracy would have to take responsibility. There are no collateral victims in the attempt to convince other countries to become democratic by using economic incentives and simple persuasion.

It is not the first time that populations proud of their political organizations thought that they had to export their values elsewhere. Athens shone in the era of Pericles, France in the Jacobin period, and Russia under the Bolsheviks all thought it to be their right and their duty to liberate whole peoples and give them the same joys that they had fought for at home. However, in this debate, there are those who maintain, more moderately, that the best way to export the delicious fruit of democracy would have been by setting a good example domestically. In the most critical period of the French Revolution, an unexpected advocate of this was the Divine Marquis de Sade, who, in a page of exceptional clarity in *Philosophy in the Bedroom*, warned the French:

10. In the case of the European Union there are two separate stages. The first is when the EU asks prospective new members to satisfy certain requirements in order to be accepted. Among them is the requirement to enforce human rights and to establish solid democratic institutions. When the EU declares that these conditions are satisfied, new members are admitted to the EU club with equal rights. Other international organizations are less fussy about the internal constitutions of its members. Belonging to international organizations, however, can help democratization. This hypothesis has been investigated and confirmed, with special reference to regional international organizations. See Jon C. Pevehouse, *Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization*, 56 INT'L ORG. 515 (2002).

Invincible within, and by your administration and your laws a model to every race, there will not be a single government which will not strive to imitate you, not one which will not be honored by your alliance; but if, for the vainglory of establishing your principles outside your country, you neglect to care for your own felicity at home, despotism, which is no more than asleep, will awake, you will be rent by intestine disorder, you will have exhausted your monies and your soldiers, and all that, all that to return to kiss the manacles the tyrants, who will have subjugated you during your absence, will impose upon you; all you desire may be wrought without leaving your home: let other people observe you happy, and they will rush to happiness by the same road you have traced for them.¹¹

Many powerful states have attempted to impose their own regimes elsewhere over the last five centuries. Foreign-imposed, domestic institutions were based on a variety of ideologies. There are historical examples of Catholic, Protestant, Monarchic, Republican, Communist, and Fascist regimes.¹² Is it possible to identify specific features that make democracy an ideology different from those of the past? I can single out one key feature only: democracy is the only regime that aims to give to the people the opportunity to choose, including the possibility of democratically choosing to not be democratic. If this feature is lost, there will be no difference between democracy and the other tyrannical impositions of the past.

EXPORTING DEMOCRACY THROUGH A WORLD PARLIAMENT RATHER THAN MILITARY INVASIONS

Several articles in this issue are devoted to discuss, defend and elaborate the proposal of creating a world parliament as a leading tool to foster global democracy.¹³ Before concluding this note, it is worth comparing the idea of a world parliament with the notion of exporting democracy. The ultimate goal of the two approaches appears similar: to increase the level of democracy in

11. THE MARQUIS DE SADE: THE COMPLETE JUSTINE PHILOSOPHY IN THE BEDROOM AND OTHER WRITINGS 339 (Richard Seaver & Austryn Wainhouse trans., 1965).

12. For an interesting historical analysis over five centuries, see John M. Owen, IV, *The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions*, 56 INT'L ORG. 375, 375-409 (2002).

13. Reasons supporting the creation of a world parliamentary assembly are provided, among others, in Daniele Archibugi, *The Reform of the UN and Cosmopolitan Democracy: A Critical Review*, 30 J. OF PEACE RES. 301, 303-09 (1993); see DAVID HELD, *DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE* (1995); Andrew L. Strauss, *Overcoming the Dysfunction of the Bifurcated Global System: The Promise of a Peoples Assembly*, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 489, 489-511 (1999); Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, *Toward Global Parliament*, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 212, 212-20 (1991); GEORGE MONBIOT, *THE AGE OF CONSENT: A MANIFESTO FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER* (2003).

our planet. But the two views are based on opposite understandings of the causal relationships between internal and international democracy.¹⁴

The attempt to export democracy militarily acts primarily on the internal constitution of authoritarian states, mainly with democratization of states. It is also implicitly assumed that increasing the number of democratic countries will lead to an international system based on cooperation, peace and, ultimately, democratic values; but there is not an explicit commitment to apply the norms and values of democracy at the global level. Those who advocate the exporting of democracy are also prepared to use means that are incompatible with democratic values and procedures. The governments of democratic states are considered the agents of this mission and no, or little, consultation is required with their own people. Foreign policy as well as armed intervention is directly decided by governments. There is little need for a democratic government to consult the will of those people in other countries who have the misfortune of living under a dictatorship. This approach is informed by power: exporting democracy relies on the contingent circumstance that some governments have not only the willingness, but also the resources to be used for this purpose.

The proposal of a world parliament, on the contrary, assumes that a new institution directly representing the citizens of the world will also act as an instrument to achieve democratization inside those countries that are not yet democratic. The main factor here at stake is persuasion. Although governments of like-minded states may be playing a crucial role in implementing the proposal, the life of a World Parliament will not be dependent on the founding governments, but rather on their own people. Any Parliament counts votes and does not weigh them. The result is that each elected member enjoys equal dignity, regardless if he or she has been appointed in a strong or a weak constituency. If such a venture is promoted by the most powerful nations, it should be seen as an attempt to make any existing power accountable to everybody.

We have already argued that an individual government cannot unilaterally decide which governments are or are not legitimate. An intergovernmental organization will be in a better position to make such a judgment, but even with a very large consensus it will always be the expression of governments rather than of the people. A World Parliament will have the possibility to give voice to political oppositions in non-democratic countries that are internally repressed, thus giving representation also to those people that should ultimately benefit from importing democracy. It will therefore be much less perceived as an instrument of external imposition.

It is quite clear that the project sponsored by George Bush and Tony Blair of exporting democracy militarily has grossly failed. But this failure should not destroy the idea that all countries of the world may reach democratic

14. I provide a wider analysis of the conditions for international democratization in my forthcoming book, DANIELE ARCHIBUGI, *A WORLD OF DEMOCRACY: A COSMOPOLITAN PERSPECTIVE* (Forthcoming 2008).

governance, provided this is done through persuasion and dialogue. A World Parliament may be the most effective way to defend and renovate the democratic ideal after the muddle of the Iraqi invasion.

TABLE 1. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS WITH UNITED STATES'
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC EXPORTS¹⁵

State	Year	Democratic governance after 5 years
Iraq	2003-Ongoing	No
Afghanistan	2002-Ongoing	No
Kosovo	1999-Ongoing	No
Bosnia	1995-Ongoing	No
Haiti	1994-1996	No
Somalia	1993-1994	No
Panama	1989	Yes
Grenada	1983	Yes
Cambodia	1970-1973	No
South Vietnam	1964-1973	No
Laos	1964-1974	No
Dominican Republic	1965-1966	No
South Korea	1945-1950	No
Japan	1945-1952	Yes
West Germany	1945-1949	Yes
Italy	1943-1945	Yes
Dominican Republic	1916-1924	No
Russia	1918-1922	No
Cuba	1917-1922	No
Haiti	1915-1934	No
Mexico	1914	No
Nicaragua	1909-1933	No
Cuba	1906-1909	No
Panama	1903-1936	No
Cuba	1898-1902	No

15. Andreatta, *supra* note 5; Owen, *supra* note 13; Pei & Kasper, *supra* note 5.